This battle was the first large-scale battle between the main force of Nishino and Qingma Group during the War of Liberation. Accurately speaking, this battle is a battle between Qingma Quanqi Eight Brigade and Xiye Second Longitudinal 359 Brigade, Independent Four Brigade and Teaching Brigade. More than 800 people were killed or injured in Qingma cavalry (more than 320 people were killed or injured in Qiba Brigade Heavy Weapons Battalion and Gansu Baoan 2nd Regiment, with more than 2 10 horses; The first rescue battle of the Eighth Brigade and the First Regiment killed and injured more than 340 people and more than 400 horses. Nearly 100 people were killed or injured in the second rescue; The 2nd Regiment of the Eighth Brigade and the Guard Brigade of the 82nd Division rescued 160 people and lost more than 20 horses. After the war, Ma Bufang, who was in Xining, learned the solution of "He Shui". After the exultation, he vigorously publicized the so-called victory of Heshui, and sent Guo, director of Qinghai Civil Affairs Bureau, and others to form a huge condolence group, leading Qinghai Song and Dance Troupe to set off from Xining and travel to Xifeng, Qingyang and Heshui. Longdong went to Xining to hold a celebration party and make various reports. Ma Jiyuan also made a special trip back to Lanzhou, Xining and other places, reporting the Battle of Heshui to Northwest Aviation Academy and Ma Bufang. In recognition of his meritorious service, the government awarded medals, medals and various prizes to the officers and men of the 82nd Division who made meritorious service in this battle.

Compared with the conspicuous victory of Qingma, the PLA's performance is relatively low-key. On June 1947, Wang Zhen, commander of the Second Longitudinal Army, who was moving closer to the main force of Nishino in the northwest of Heshui, sent a telegram to Nishino. In the telegram, Wang Zhen said sadly, "The Battle of Heshui failed completely, which affected the whole campaign. I have a responsibility. Only Qingma is used to being brave and good at fighting, shooting well and acting quickly and resolutely. Fighting * * * casualties of more than eight hundred people, cadres, serious casualties, ammunition consumption (nine brigade almost exhausted) must be transferred to an area for a few days "Peng,:

..... We all lost the battle, which affected the whole battle. I have a responsibility. Only Qingma is used to fighting bravely, being good at shooting and fighting, and acting quickly and boldly. It is not exaggerating to cover up mistakes, nor is it recognized as an invincible enemy. The characteristics of green horses can provide information for future actions. More than 800 people were killed or injured in the battle, cadres suffered serious casualties, and ammunition consumption was high (nine brigades were almost exhausted), so they had to be transferred to an area for a few days.

Wang Zhen at the end of June 1 "

The 9th Brigade mentioned by Wang Zhen in this telegram is the 359th Brigade, probably because the fighting just ended, and the casualties were not accurately counted at the moment, and the casualties mentioned by Wang Zhen were also inaccurate. Peng, commander of Xiye, wrote clearly in the Basic Summary of Nine-month Operations in Northern Shaanxi (later presented to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China): "After fighting Panlong, we will rest for 13 days, that is, fighting Longdong. Everyone here made the mistake of underestimating the enemy. Our soldiers were divided into three roads, and there were casualties in the battle with water 12000 people. The brigade commander of the 359 brigade was injured and played a war of attrition. " The book "The First Field Army" clearly records: "I suffered more than 2,500 casualties, only wiped out the enemy 1520, and had to quit the battle." Wang Enmao, the political commissar of the Second Vertical, also recorded in his diaries on May 3 1 and 1947: "... The battle of Heshui suffered heavy casualties, but it didn't win the final victory, which affected the whole campaign of Longdong and prevented it from developing as planned. I feel very sorry and uneasy. " On June 1 day, Wang Enmao continued to seriously review the reasons for the defeat in Heshui Campaign in his diary: "The enemy we fought in Heshui was the 22nd Regiment of the 82nd Division, 8th Brigade, and Par Square in Qinghai Province. Its characteristic is that although the weapons are not good and there are no heavy firearms, it is tenacious and can fight independently. After being defeated, you can counter charge; Because of ethnic relations, the deception of the enemy and our propaganda, it is not easy to hand over our guns after the defeat. When we defeat the enemy in place A, the enemy in place B will definitely come to reinforce us. Moreover, after being defeated once, reinforcements will come again. There are many objective reasons why the battle did not destroy the enemy and achieved complete victory: the enemy was tenacious and there were three reinforcements. The defeat of Heshui has a great lesson for Nishino. After the battle, the 2nd vertical moved to the northwest of Heshui, close to Nishino, and Nishino ordered the 2nd vertical to rest for 10 day, and mobilized officers and men to review the reasons for Heshui's defeat. When summing up the battle of He Hui, Wang Zhen said sadly: "Since I joined the revolution, I have fought hundreds of battles, some of which were victories and some were defeats. I have never fought such a bad battle in the Long March and the South-North Return. I lost this time. "After a profound review, the officers and men realized the religious rule of Ma Jiajun Group's troops, the kinship of officers, the ignorance and tenacity of soldiers, and reviewed their lack of understanding of the tactical characteristics of the enemy's continuous reinforcements, impatience and underestimation. The soldiers attacked Qingning and Ma Ning in three ways at the same time. At the same time, the troops generally lack practical experience in dealing with cavalry. Peng recalled at a meeting of cadres at or above the battalion level in the last ten days of 1947+00: "As far as the organization of the whole campaign is concerned, we made the mistake of dividing our troops. "