After the siege of Deng Baishan, Liu Jing first put forward the proposal of "marrying by oneself" to Emperor Gaozu: "If big princess, born of the queen, can marry Modu, and give him a generous gift, and he knows that this is the daughter of the queen of the Han Dynasty, and it is a generous gift for him, the rude Huns will be happy and marry big princess, then her son must be a prince and will inherit the throne in the future. Why? Because the Huns are short-sighted after all, they will definitely covet the rich gifts of the Han Dynasty. Your majesty often appeases and presents things that were superfluous all the year round in the Han Dynasty and rare in Xiongnu. By the way, send someone with a glib tongue to enlighten him on the etiquette of the Han Dynasty. When modu chanyu was in office, he must be the son-in-law of the Han dynasty; He died, and the grandson of the Han Dynasty was a monarch. Who has ever heard that my grandson dares to compete with my grandfather? The army can make Huns surrender gradually without going to war. If your majesty can't send big princess and let the imperial daughter or concubine pretend to be a princess, he will know and refuse to respect and get close to her, which will be of no benefit. " Although Emperor Gaozu didn't send his own big princess after all, he still found a maid-in-waiting and married the demon king modu chanyu in the name of big princess. Liu Jing was sent to conclude a covenant of negotiation and marriage with the Huns.

Later generations have always believed that handsome men should bow to the Huns barbarians and even condescend to give Han women to Huns as concubines, which can neither reduce the military pressure of Huns on Han, nor achieve the purpose of containing Huns through intermarriage, because most of the "princesses" given to relatives in the early years of the Western Han Dynasty can only be regarded as partial princesses of Khan, but can't become wives, giving birth to princes and Chu Jun attached to the Han Dynasty. If we look at it from this aspect alone, do we think that the democratic policy of the Korean government is a failure? In fact, the evaluation of the success or failure of the pro-democracy policy needs multi-faceted analysis.

First, from the inside of the Han Dynasty, the so-called "princess" sent is not the real royal big princess, but the little princess of the royal family, and more even the maids sent by the people. But even these "pro-princesses" are very attractive to the distant Huns, and they represent the advanced court culture of the Han Dynasty and the elegant and charming femininity of China. As early as during the siege of Deng Baishan, Chen Ping conveyed to E Shi, the wife of Morton at that time, that she was going to give a beautiful woman from the Han Dynasty to Morton to win his favor, which made E Shi agree to persuade Morton to let Gaozu escape. This also shows from another side that even in the eyes of Huns, Han women are still more attractive than Huns. This is why it is guaranteed that even if Huns know that they are not real royal "princesses", they are still willing to accept these "pro-princesses". From this point of view, the Han government can send these "pro-princesses" and their envoys to Xiongnu in the name of Princess Han without spending a lot of money, and this pro-princess plan itself has high implementation value.

Second, although the Han Dynasty arranged a large number of entourage and dowry materials for Qin and Qin, in the process of going to Xiongnu, these entourage could learn about the local customs and natural conditions along the way, go deep into the hinterland of Xiongnu and get first-hand information about their production and life. This is very valuable information for the further strategic decision of the Han government. As for the dowry materials, as Liu Jing said, they are nothing more than what the Huns did not have in the Han Dynasty, and will not cause too heavy economic burden to the Han Dynasty. Similarly, the process of delivering materials to the Huns every time is also an opportunity to learn more about the enemy. In the battle with the Huns, the biggest problem encountered by the Han army was the erratic whereabouts of the Xiongnu army and tribes. Through the pro-Qin and pro-Qin material transportation afterwards, the Han government can just grasp the accurate location and stationing habits of the Xiongnu army and major tribes, which laid a good foundation for the active attack on Xiongnu during the period of Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty.

Thirdly, affinity is not only an exchange between people, but also a gradual means. Starting from Liu Jing's strategy, the products of the Han Dynasty were used to gradually change the appreciation and consumption patterns of the Xiongnu upper class. The so-called things that were rich in the Han Dynasty but not long for the Huns were essentially things with economic advantages in the Han Dynasty, which were used to guide and further change the inherent consumption structure of the Huns' nomadic economic habits, so that their upper classes were accustomed to and willing to accept the consumption culture and strong economic status of the Han Dynasty, and finally achieved the goal of controlling the Huns economically. This can also be confirmed from another group of people. Zhong Xing said that he was a waiter who accompanied the princess during the reign of Emperor Wen of the Western Han Dynasty, and he was the executor of the Western Han Dynasty's pro-government. He should be very clear about the purpose of the Western Han Dynasty's pro-government. But he was dissatisfied with the Han government forcing him to go to Xiongnu. After he arrived in Xiongnu, he surrendered to Xiongnu and revealed to Xiong Mu Khan the strategic intention behind the Han government and relatives. The theory of China Bank tells Shan Yu: "You are only a small part of Huns, even the population of a county in the Han Dynasty. Why was the Han Dynasty afraid of you? " It is because you have a completely different production and lifestyle from the Han Dynasty that you have no dependence on the Han economy. Now, the Han government takes advantage of the opportunity of marriage to import China's food, clothing and beauty, just to make you change your customs and like China's things. However, you Huns can't produce this thing on your own, and ultimately you have to rely on the Han people to supply it. At this rate, the Huns will be annexed by the Han sooner or later. "In fact, the purpose of recording this passage in Historical Records of Xiongnu is not to show how far-sighted this theory is, nor to prove that Xiongnu Khan gave up accepting pro-Han, but to supplement the so-called pro-Han policy of the Western Han government from another side, which actually contains the meaning of attack, that is, to use the economic advantages of Han to gradually change and subdue Xiongnu. After all, several Khan still didn't stop collecting relatives, and completely gave up the personnel and materials imported by Korea.

Fourthly, the pro-Qin policy of the Han government not only applied to the Huns, but also used the pro-Qin policy to win over Wusun, another important minority regime in the western regions. During the period of Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty, two princesses, Xi Jun and Xie You, were sent to marry the then King Wusun and become their wives. Feng Gui, the handmaid who accompanied Xie You to marry Wu Sun, also married Wu Sun's powerful right general. They won such a heavyweight ally as Wusun for Han in the Western Regions and played a vital role in cooperating with the Han army in conquering Xiongnu. For Han, the moral issue of affinity is far less important than the overall strategy of national interests. Both princesses have experienced the ethical dilemma of bereavement and remarriage of their husbands' brothers and even stepsons. On the grounds of "when in Rome, do as the Romans do", Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty asked them to continue their pro-marriage mission according to the custom of Wusun nationality. This is nothing more than the imagination of later generations under the influence of Confucian orthodoxy, especially in the era when Neo-Confucianism dominated in the Song Dynasty.

Fifthly, the pro-Huns of the Western Han government itself can be divided into two periods, which is bounded by Emperor Wu's massive crusade against Huns and his strategic victory. In the early stage, pro-loyalty focused on defense, but it also played an active role in preparing for the strategic attack of Emperor Wu. In the later period, the focus became "pro", which made the divided Xiongnu tribes submit to the pro-Han regime. As we all know, Zhao Jun went to the fortress, that is, after the Han Dynasty destroyed Zhi Zhi Khan, Xie Han Khan personally entered the DPRK in 33 BC and asked for a kiss to make a lasting friendship. At this time, the offensive and defensive situation of Xiongnu and Han changed fundamentally. The kinship changed from the initiative of the Western Han Dynasty to the initiative of the Xiongnu, the essence of which was that the divided Xiongnu Khan tried to consolidate his position with the help of the Western Han government. Throughout the implementation of the pro-Qin policy in the Western Han Dynasty, it effectively ensured the implementation of the long-term strategy of the Western Han Dynasty to the Huns, and finally realized the fundamental transformation of the offensive and defensive positions of both sides. Isn't this proof of the success of the pro-Western Han policy?

In the Song Dynasty, in view of the historical examples of the Western Han Dynasty, officials kept proposing to follow the example of the Western Han Dynasty and conclude a "pro-marriage" with the northern minority regimes, but they were constantly rejected by the literati of the Song Dynasty for various reasons and finally failed to put it into practice. On the one hand, the northern minority regime also put forward the requirement of marriage. Liao Xing Zongzhen once sent Liu and others to the Southern Song Dynasty to discuss the division of land and relatives. However, in the political atmosphere of the Song Dynasty at that time, all Song Guojun politely refused. In essence, the scholar-officials in the Song Dynasty basically regarded themselves as a nation with superior culture, and flatly refused to marry the minority regimes such as Beiliao, Xixia and Jin. They even think that once they marry these "barbarians", they will be regarded as "bring disgrace to oneself", which is more humiliating than losing the battle. On the other hand, women cultivated in this ethical culture cannot shoulder the heavy responsibility of "affinity" and alliance. Compared with the confidence and decisiveness of women in the Han Dynasty, none of the women in the Song Dynasty who married in the north can produce Zhao Jun and Mrs. Feng. Supporting marriage will not have the political effect it deserves.

The deeper reason is that the Song Dynasty lost the national self-confidence and initiative of the Han Dynasty: the result of blind self-isolation is the loss of the opportunity to know the opponent; The result of simply bribing and appeasing the northern minority regime with economic interests without seeking progress is to completely lose the strategic initiative position, and finally the grassland ethnic groups passively waiting for the rise in the desert are forced to fall into the tragic situation of national subjugation and power loss under extortion. If the scholar-officials in Song Dynasty who emphasized the distinction between Chinese and foreigners knew that the Han people in Song Dynasty were finally conquered and enslaved by the grassland people, would Sima Guang still sneer at the pro-Western Han policy in Zi Tong Zhi Jian? Can you still dismiss Emperor Wu of Han Dynasty's policy of forcibly recruiting Xiongnu as belligerence? Generally speaking, the prosperity of the Western Han Dynasty lies not in national strength, but in the masculinity and publicity of the national spirit. Even the women in the Western Han Dynasty are full of unrestrained and free-spirited personality charm. The weakness of the Song Dynasty was not due to the poor national strength, but to the conservatism and retreat of the national consciousness as a whole, so that even the scholar-officials remained weak and depressed in cultural narcissism, military passivity and spiritual imprisonment. Therefore, such a grand strategy as "affinity", which combines attack and defense, can only achieve results in an open and enterprising era like the Western Han Dynasty.