Any maritime armed forces have a clear responsibility. In principle, a smallest navy has three tasks: defending national interests abroad, demonstrating national strength in peacetime, and completing maritime control in a certain area. However, the task and the opponent are always two sides of the same question. Without opponents, there would be no problems such as defending national interests, demonstrating national strength, and controlling sea power. The scale and nature of the opponent determines the scale and nature of the task and the efficiency and characteristics of the maritime armed forces. China's marine geographical environment is very similar to German and Russian. Geographically, it is surrounded by a series of islands and does not directly face the sea, but militarily, it is surrounded by many medium-capacity maritime troops. There are two factors that are more unfavorable than Germany and the former Soviet Union. First, in addition to its biggest strategic rival, several medium-sized maritime forces around China are comparable to China and deliberately surpass China. They stared at China with hatred, trying to regard China as a strategic stepping stone to the sea. Second, the country has not yet achieved complete reunification, and de facto separatist forces are struggling in the corner. There are extensive disputes over territorial ownership and maritime rights and interests between China and neighboring countries, and there are many hot spots in the surrounding waters, sometimes showing signs of conflict. It can be said that China has more maritime rivals than its long land border. With the passage of time and the compression of space, the crises in the waters around China occur frequently, which is inevitable. Development in response to the maritime crisis will be another remarkable feature of the development of China's maritime armed forces. It can't be smooth sailing, which is the strategic fate of the Chinese nation leading to the ocean. The modernization of maritime armed forces is an important guarantee to realize national modernization, but it is also a development process that needs careful care. The correct use and construction of maritime armed forces is the basic content of marine strategy. I remember Chairman Mao once said that we should build the navy well and make the enemy afraid. Under the strategic background at that time, this sentence vividly explained the position, function and basic task of the navy. Now we still can't discuss the future ocean strategy without this idea. We should have a clear awareness of ourselves and the enemy (under the bluff of the West, there is a saying that any country can engage in "strategic mutual trust", even Taiwan Province Province wants to engage in "strategic mutual trust" with the mainland, and I really don't know what to do), determine the current and future tasks and plan the development steps under the overall strategic background. 1, to correctly determine the current and future tasks, we must do what we can. At present and in the future, the maritime armed forces should undertake the following tasks and carry out corresponding capacity building: First, undertake strategic nuclear counterattack tasks. In the historical process of continuous development and growth, China will always face various forms of strategic blackmail, the most dangerous of which is nuclear blackmail, which has happened many times in history and will continue to happen in the future. An effective second or even third sea-based nuclear counterattack force is the best means to deal with this nuclear blackmail, which is also the most valuable part of the contemporary navy. There is no room for negotiation in building a nuclear navy with reliable strategic deterrence, and sufficient redundancy should be left in the strength establishment. While building a nuclear navy capable of carrying out strategic nuclear strikes, we should also strive to build a nuclear navy capable of carrying out conventional strikes when national strength permits. The development of digital earth and long-range cruise missiles has greatly expanded the capability of underwater nuclear power. If a nuclear submarine carries 40-60 conventional missiles, about 10 nuclear submarine will be able to project 400-600 high explosive precision guided weapons to any corner of the earth at one time, which can achieve amazing strike effect. If the size of the nuclear submarine fleet is expanded to about 50 in wartime, 2000-3000 high-explosive precision guided weapons can be projected at one time, and the effect achieved will far exceed the tactical and operational levels, and will achieve very considerable strategic effects. Nuclear weapons will add more flexible strategic deterrent force, thus increasing the flexibility, reliability and flexibility of national strategic choice, and become another form of killer weapon. Second, we must be able to effectively intercept the battlefield in the western Pacific. Any Asian power must fully consider the concentration of East Asia in the power crisis outside the region in its strategic conception at all levels. In the past, under the condition of limited technical means, the old Japanese navy once designed a tactic called "nine-stage strike". Now, the diversification of technical means makes this "interception" more flexible. It can be carried out in a lasting three-dimensional way without using a huge surface fleet. It can be carried out with various weapons from underwater, water surface, air and space, with low cost and high cost-effectiveness ratio, which can achieve twice the result with half the effort and will cause great strategic burden to potential opponents. Third, we must be able to effectively control specific local sea areas. Whether the local waters can be effectively controlled is related to the reunification of the motherland, China's territorial integrity and maritime rights and interests, and the strategic security of coastal economic zones. At present and in the future, whether we can ensure the sea control right of most of the Yellow Sea, most of the East China Sea, the surrounding areas of Taiwan Province Province and most of the South China Sea will be a test of China's maritime strategic ability, a key problem to be solved in the construction of maritime armed forces, and also the basis for China to go to the sea in the future. Without this solid foundation, even if a small fleet can be sent far away, it will be like a kite with a broken line and can only be blown away by the wind and rain. Fourth, we must have a certain ability to escort ocean transportation. Apart from our main strategic rivals, we really can't watch some clowns sabotage our ocean shipping. But this ability can only be limited or even symbolic in the foreseeable future, just like the now-hyped escort in the Gulf of Aden. With China's current ocean shipping demand, it is impossible to achieve reliable route guarantee without a global navy, and once the confrontation between China and its main strategic rivals turns into a real crisis, China's huge ocean shipping routes will be in jeopardy immediately. The experience of two world wars and many local wars has fully proved this point, and we should not have unrealistic illusions about it. 2. Distinguish different strategic stages, and don't rush for success. Sending a huge fleet to the ocean looks magnificent and inspiring, but it is also likely to be a reckless and useless move. Some countries that lack strategic details are repeating the same mistakes. India, for example, really don't know what kind of strategic purpose it wants to achieve by dying for several outdated aircraft carriers, or just to show off its prestige. Others such as Thailand, Brazil, Argentina, Spain, Italy, etc. It is really puzzling that all claim to have an aircraft carrier and what it is used for. Any maritime power in history has experienced several progressive stages of development, and the development of China is no exception. The first stage: the stage of comprehensive defense. Preventing imperialism from invading from the sea is the main strategic task for quite a period after the founding of People's Republic of China (PRC), and it is also the theme of the national marine strategy. Under the guidance of this goal, the national marine strategy can only implement the policy of comprehensive defense. There are a lot of people nagging now. It seems that the helmsman at that time had no sense of sea power and modern thought, so that we could not quickly build a navy with ocean-going ability. This is wishful thinking that is completely divorced from reality. Even today, I'm afraid we should be cautious whether we can say with complete confidence that the danger of imperialist invasion from the sea has been fundamentally lifted. The "from sea to land" strategy pursued by the United States also includes China, and the maritime armed forces of the United States and its allies still bring great strategic pressure to the economically developed coastal areas of China. The second stage: the combination of strategic defense and campaign attack, the active defense stage. In any case, after 60 years of development and growth, China's marine strategy should go to this stage. At this stage, under the premise of overall strategic defense, we should constantly develop the offensive in the campaign. Attack is the basic means to destroy the enemy, as in any war. Only by implementing the policy of active defense can we change passivity into initiative, gradually improve the unfavorable strategic situation and enhance the stability of strategic defense. We can't sit back and watch our opponents build more and more tight encirclement in front of their own homes. Strengthen the control of local sea areas from the aspects of sea battlefield construction, equipment construction, military drills and comprehensive intelligence support. A prominent problem is that active defense urgently requires the solution of the Taiwan Province Province problem as soon as possible, and the timetable for solving the Taiwan Province Province problem should be determined according to the needs of marine strategy, rather than making the Taiwan Province Province problem subordinate to and serve a pure political game (which is exactly what the United States and Japan hope). To put it bluntly, if the future Chinese aircraft carrier fleet is not based in Taiwan Province Province, it is likely to become a pile of useless waste. Contrary to the understanding of ordinary people, the author believes that aircraft carrier formation is not needed to solve the South China Sea issue. In the South China Sea, China can use conventional air and sea power to solve problems, no matter who its opponent is. Compared with the huge aircraft carrier formation, the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea are just equivalent to baths, and the South China Sea is just a little too big to spread its hands and feet. Only the ocean can really use the aircraft carrier formation. It is conceivable that in ten or fifteen years' time, when China's aircraft carrier formation begins to take shape, China's huge maritime forces can only cruise offshore within the scope of Taiwan Province Province, which will be an embarrassing picture. Of course, if you want to cross the island chain and enter the ocean, it can be unimpeded in peacetime, but it has no practical significance. Under peaceful conditions, even the largest aircraft carrier formation can cross the Straits of Malacca and enter the Indian Ocean. However, once in wartime, what will happen to the isolated fleet? Therefore, while building an aircraft carrier fleet, we must solve the problem of the fleet entering the ocean. There is no other way to solve this problem except Taiwan Province Province. The third stage: the stage of riding the ocean. Undoubtedly, the dispute over maritime rights and interests off the coast of China has been basically solved, and the main task of the maritime armed forces is to protect China's interests on a global scale. Only at this time can we talk about the effective protection of China's ocean-going routes. However, if China's maritime armed forces develop to this extent, it must be a major historical change in the world strategic map, and the world power structure will also undergo earth-shaking changes, which we can't imagine. 3. Develop a comprehensive and balanced power system to raise soldiers for use. The characteristics of the future use of soldiers at sea require that any modern navy should have a comprehensive power system. Predicting future wars is probably an innate hobby of human beings, and people of any nationality will enjoy it. But unfortunately, people's predictions of war are rarely accurate, or even roughly accurate. A common fault of people is that the estimation of future wars is often too simple. Since we know that people's wisdom is poor, it is better to think deeply about its possible characteristics than to paint the future with all our efforts. For China, what are the characteristics of the future maritime war? First, it will have a huge scale. Because the production scale and manufacturing capacity of modern society are too strong, war is the movement of materials, and the scale of war is correspondingly large as many manufactured things can be moved by people. Second, it will be all the space. Wherever human technicians can go, they may become battlefields. Third, it will last. There will be an unprecedented life-and-death contest in the vast space, and there will be absolutely no winning or losing in a short time. This requires China's maritime armed forces to have a huge scale first, and only a few sophisticated weapons can't win. Secondly, there must be a complete system, covering combatants, including all maritime armed forces and equipment involving land, sea and air. There are never outdated weapons in war, and what kind of weapons are always used to fight what battles. You can't win by blindly pursuing the so-called high precision. It is precisely because of such characteristics and requirements that the construction of China's maritime armed forces must take the road of comprehensive and balanced development, not only to develop all kinds of surface assault forces, but also to develop all kinds of underwater forces and develop air power that integrates air and space. At the same time, we can't ignore the land-based forces of the navy, including the Marine Corps and shore-based missile units. It is necessary to correctly coordinate the relationship between quality and quantity, equipment and production, assault force and support force, active force and reserve force. Make China's maritime armed forces a comprehensive, balanced and powerful force system. Such a system can withstand wind, rain and stormy seas. It can be said that so far, no maritime power in the world has reached such a level, including the US Navy. The US Navy makes full use of its allies' resources, and some functions are assigned to them. Therefore, it is not only impossible to develop a comprehensive and balanced power system overnight, but also an unprecedented great undertaking, which requires the efforts of the whole nation and cannot be simplified or impatient.