In fact, the economic and military strength of China at that time was not worse than that of Japan. Economically, before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, Japan's heavy industry was still relatively weak, and only the textile industry was relatively developed in light industry. The output of steel, coal, copper, kerosene and machinery manufacturing is much lower than that of China. At that time, the industrial capital of Japan was 70 million, the bank capital was 90 million, the annual import volume was 65.438+700 million, the annual export volume was 90 million, and the annual fiscal revenue was 80 million. These indicators are lower than those of China except that the import volume is equivalent to that of China, indicating that the Japanese economic strength was not as strong as that of China at that time. Militarily, in the 20-20 years before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, Japan made every effort to enhance its military strength, paying special attention to naval construction. By 1893, there were 55 warships with a displacement of 6 1000 tons, which was equivalent to beiyang fleet, the main naval force of China (Guangdong and Fujian navies in China). The Japanese standing army has 220,000 people, the total strength is less than half that of China, and there is little difference in weapons and equipment. Obviously, the contrast of military strength between China and Japan is not as wide as the broadsword and spear in the Opium War, but in some respects, such as the total amount of navy and army, China still has a slight advantage. In other words, China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War was not due to its military strength.

So, what was the reason for China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War? What lessons should we learn from it? What reference does this have for safeguarding national security and strengthening national defense construction today?

1. Lack of foresight and inadequate preparation for the possible war of aggression are the cognitive reasons for the failure of the war.

/kloc-In the late 20th century, major capitalist countries have completed the transition to the imperialist stage, and capital export is of great significance, which will inevitably lead to more intense colonial competition. Lenin analyzed that the imperialist powers "not only periodically re-divide the divided world, but also the competition for semi-independent countries will inevitably become particularly tense." As a result, semi-feudal and semi-colonial China, with vast territory and abundant resources, became a piece of fat meat in the eyes of imperialist powers. Since the Opium War, the imperialist aggression against China has never stopped. However, after the Sino-French War of 1884, it was relatively calm for about 10 years due to the busy struggle among the great powers, and the nerves of French politicians relaxed a little. When people rejoice at the "friendliness" of western powers, a neighboring country in the East is eyeing it.

After the Meiji Restoration in Japan (65438+ 1960), capitalism developed rapidly and combined with the feudal bushido spirit, resulting in a militaristic freak, which was extremely expansionary and predatory.

Invading and defeating China is an established national policy of modern Japan. As early as 1855, Yoshida Shouyou, a Japanese reformist politician, thought: "Once the warship cannon is slightly enriched, it is easy to exploit shrimp. Light rain Ryukyu, making it the same pilgrimage; Accuse North Korea of paying tribute; Cut all the land in South China, take Taiwan Province Province and Luzon Islands, occupy all China and come to India. " Yoshida's thoughts had a far-reaching influence on his disciples, such as Ito Bowen (Prime Minister of the Cabinet) and Yamagata Aritomo (Speaker of the Senate), who later became Japanese politicians, and became the mainstream thoughts of Japanese politicians. At the beginning of Meiji Restoration, Japan laid the mainland policy. Minister Tanaka said in his memorial: "The legacy of Emperor Meiji is to conquer Taiwan Province Province in the first stage, Korea in the second stage, Manchuria in the third stage, zhina in the fourth stage and the world in the fifth stage." If these arguments are still a "blueprint", they will be very specific in 1887. The Japanese government formulated the General Plan of the Qing Army's Conquest and decided to complete the preparations for the war against China before 1892. The attack direction is Korea, Liaodong Peninsula, Shandong Peninsula, Penghu Islands, Taiwan Province Province and Zhoushan Islands. Seven years later, Japan launched a war of aggression according to this timetable and road map, and almost achieved all its goals.

Japan has consistently implemented the above-mentioned national policy for decades, made full preparations in all aspects, and implemented eight "military expansion for the record" before and after. In the years before the Sino-Japanese War, the average annual military expenditure was as high as 365,438+0% of the total income. 1887, the emperor ordered 300,000 yuan from the royal funds as a naval subsidy. Although the money is not much, it expresses the determination of the supreme ruler and is bound to have a great incentive effect on the whole country. Sure enough, under the inspiration of the emperor, rich people all over the country donated money in succession, with more than 6.5438+0 million yuan a year. This not only increased military expenditure, but also greatly boosted people's morale. While expanding its army, Japan sent a large number of spies to China and North Korea. Before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, it drew a detailed map of every hill and road, including Korea and Liaodong Peninsula of China, Shandong Peninsula and Bohai Sea. Japan is like a well-made war machine, which keeps running. Once the time is right, it will not hesitate to resort to force. In contrast, the Qing government's judgment on the national security situation was very insufficient, and it lacked due foresight and vigilance against aggression.

Some people of insight, such as Shen Baozhen, Governor of Liangjiang River and Liu Mingchuan, Governor of Taiwan Province, saw that "the Japanese should not be underestimated", but the understanding of Japan by the imperial court and most politicians remained at the stage of "being a small country with few people" and "not caring about the Japanese". Li Hongzhang, who has an important responsibility for national defense, also believes that "the Japanese people are suffering from long-term worries rather than short-term worries." At the critical moment when Japan was fully expanding its army and the danger of war approached, the Qing government relaxed its national defense construction, cut its military budget on the grounds of financial shortage, stopped buying warships from 1888 and stopped allocating funds for naval equipment and ammunition from 189 1. It was in this unconscious state that China ushered in a fateful war.

The Sino-Japanese War began in Korea. /kloc-In the late 20th century, North Korea has always been an important stage for international political forces to compete, and it is also a hot spot in Sino-Japanese relations. Japan not only wants to compete for rights and interests in North Korea, but also regards it as the frontier of aggression against China and has been looking for opportunities. This opportunity finally came at 1894. At that time, there was civil strife in North Korea, and the North Korean government requested China to send troops to support it (historically, North Korea was a vassal of China at that time). At the same time that China sent troops to Korea, the Japanese army also entered Korea on a large scale, and the war began. At this time, under the banner of protecting overseas Chinese in China, Japan told the South Korean government that "the Japanese government will have no other intentions". In fact, as Foreign Minister Luo Zongguang said: "The determination to wage war was decided when the imperial government sent troops to North Korea. Japan's use of this good topic is simply to take this opportunity to promote the breakdown of Sino-Japanese relations. " On June 2, Japan set up a wartime base camp; On June 9, the Japanese army landed in Incheon and immediately occupied Seoul. As Lu Aozong said, "militarily, everything is preemptive." Until now, the Qing government still had no accurate judgment on the explosive war situation, and hoped that both China and Japan would withdraw their troops at the same time. Li Hongzhang's instruction to the North Korean army is: "Don't go to war for no reason, don't go to war with yourself first." The instruction to the Beiyang Navy was: "Although Japan increased its troops, it did not fight with me. Why do you have to fight? You should keep quiet. " Li Hongzhang believes: "The negotiations between the two countries are all about rewarding merits, and they cannot be done by coercion. Although Japan is fully preparing for war, I won't go to war first. It is the practice of all countries that whoever goes to war first will take charge first. "

It is understandable to avoid the first shot for diplomatic initiative. But it is important not to make actual preparations for the war because of fantasy, so that the enemy can adjust his troops calmly and occupy the danger. It was not until the Japanese army besieged China's troops stationed in North Korea in Yashan that they rushed to send reinforcements from the sea. It's too late, too late. As a result, the army was defeated in Asan and retreated to Pyongyang. The troop carrier at sea was also ambushed by the Japanese navy. The troop carrier was sunk and nearly 2000 soldiers were buried at the bottom of the sea. Then, the battle of Pyongyang was defeated because it was unprepared and suffered heavy losses. The remnants of the army retreated more than 500 miles in one breath, and the war burned to the Yalu River. The war was overshadowed by failure from the beginning.

The defeat in the Korean battlefield greatly affected the morale of our army and encouraged the arrogance of the enemy. War is often like this. If one side is prepared and the other side is not, fight, fight early and fight hard. However, if the attacked party is clear-headed, well-prepared, and does not flinch, it will inevitably have a deterrent and containment effect on the aggressors, and it is possible to change the course of the war or even stop the war at the initial stage. However, China missed this opportunity. Its root lies in the lack of foresight in the war of aggression and the relaxation of vigilance, which leads to insufficient preparation before the war and improper measures in the first battle. This is the cognitive reason for the failure of the Sino-Japanese War, and it is also a profound lesson that needs to be learned seriously.

Second, blindly relying on foreign mediation and not focusing on one's own strength is the external reason for the failure of the war.

Although the defeat in the Korean battlefield caused some passivity, it did not affect the overall situation. At this time, if the Qing government can clearly understand the situation, resolutely invest in the anti-aggression war and adopt correct strategies, it will certainly defeat the enemy's attack. It's a pity that Empress Dowager Cixi and Yi, the supreme rulers of China, are peacemakers, and Li Hongzhang also insists on "harmony is the best". From the beginning of the war to the defeat and surrender, they have been striving for the mediation of Britain, Russia, Germany, France and the United States to achieve the goal of peace.

Diplomacy, like military affairs, is an important means of national political behavior. It is understandable that Li Hongzhang wants to use the conflict of interests between countries to contain Japan and lift the military confrontation between China and Japan. However, he obviously expected too much of the possibility of successful intervention by foreign powers, relied too much on diplomatic mediation and relaxed his military efforts. He thought that "a big country must have a place and an end" and ordered his men to "stay where they are" and "protect the ship", which almost missed the military plane and affected morale.

Li Hongzhang first asked Britain for mediation. He believes that Britain has the most vested interests in China, and the Japanese invasion of China "the British will not agree". However, I didn't expect that Britain and Japan had already conducted behind-the-scenes transactions. Britain pointed out to Japan: "Shanghai in China is the center of British interests, so the Japanese government must admit that it is not a war movement in this port and its vicinity." When the Japanese government promised that Britain's rights and interests in the Yangtze River basin would not be affected, Britain not only gave up its intervention, but also signed the Japan-Britain Treaty of Commerce and Navigation to show its support. British Foreign Secretary Kimberly said: "The nature of this treaty is far more beneficial to Japan than defeating China's army." Britain even kept silent about Japan sinking its merchant ship. In this way, China was betrayed by Britain.

Li Hongzhang turned to Russia to intervene, because Russia's sphere of influence is mainly in the northeast, which has conflicts of interest with Japan. But at this time, the Russian Siberian Railway has not yet been built, and the chips in the Far East are insufficient. I didn't want to fall out with Japan, just had a quarrel. Hurd, an Englishman who is the director of taxation in China, commented: "The Russians flirted in Tianjin, and after two weeks, they suddenly shirked. Li Hongzhang had a boring discussion with his boss. " The Qing government also asked Germany and France to mediate, which was even more futile and a waste of time.

After the failure of mediation by Britain, Russia, Germany and France, Li Hongzhang also whimsically hoped that the United States would mediate. The hypocritical United States replied: "The United States holds a solemn and neutral attitude and can only influence Japan in a friendly way." In fact, the United States is not neutral, but completely backward to Japan. Tian Bei, the US ambassador to China, publicly stated: "The war was caused by China's insistence on its suzerain status in North Korea, but that was in China." Tian, the American charge d 'affaires in China, said: "We should let the war go on our own way. If intervention brings peace, this peace will not last. Only by using force can this country and the world be in harmony. As long as the Qing Dynasty is not threatened, China's defeat is a useful experience. " Tian Bei also wrote to Li Hongzhang: "Give up the idea of seeking interference completely, turn your back on European powers and face Japan." Facing Japan here does not mean winning the war, but seeking peace and surrender. The United States has gone further than other countries in supporting Japan's invasion of China, providing military loans to Japan, sending military advisers, transporting military supplies, sheltering Japanese spies, and even allowing Japanese warships to fly the American flag to deceive China's navy. The United States regards Japan as its little buddy in the Far East, and Japan dares to wage war blatantly, relying on the backstage boss of the United States. As Lenin analyzed before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: "Japan may plunder Asian countries in the East, but without the help of other countries, it is impossible for it to have any independent financial and military power."

There are conflicts of interest and often some contradictions among big powers, but they are consistent in expanding aggression against China and deepening colonization of China in order to gain greater interests. This is the basic position of big countries, and we must keep a clear head about it. However, the Qing government and Li Hongzhang obviously didn't see this, and they had excessive expectations and illusions about the "upholding justice" of the powers. In fact, the axioms of great powers are just hypocrisy. They really believe in interests and power. The powers have long seen that Japan is a shoo-in and will inevitably fall to Japan's side. Hurd told the truth: "All countries expressed sympathy for China and said that it was wrong for the Japanese to destroy peace in this way. But no country has taken any practical action to help China. " The great powers are well aware that they can all get a share of the Japanese victory over China, just as it did after the war. The great powers benefited a lot from the robber treaties of "most favored nation treatment", "benefit sharing" and "open door".

Blindly asking for help from others, but relaxing yourself and indulging the enemy, is really a taboo in the war, and is undoubtedly on the road to disaster. Luo Ozong gloated: "From the beginning, the Qing government adopted the policy of asking European powers to intervene and quickly stop the Sino-Japanese war. Li Hongzhang repeatedly appealed to the representatives of various countries for help, telephoned his envoys in European countries, and appealed directly to the host governments. The China government ignored the humiliation of its own country, begged for mercy from the powerful country and opened its own door to meet the wolves. " As a result, the Japanese army stepped up its attack in order to make a quick decision, while China lost time and opportunity in mediation again and again, and was completely in a passive position. In dozens of battles, I failed to organize a decent resistance, as Shi Rui, assistant minister of the Ministry of Rites, said: "The more I retreat, the more arrogant I am, and the more I want to charge and be restrained." Not only has there been no progress in diplomacy, but it has also been a complete failure in the military. The main forces of the navy and the army were wiped out, and finally they had to surrender to make peace.

The warring factions of the Qing government also saw the problem. Emperor Guangxu issued a decree saying: "The dissuasion of other countries is just empty talk. We should plan ahead and support the war with war." The courtiers accused Li Hongzhang of "waiting and seeing, delaying, not advancing, blindly following mistakes, and giving dangerous places to outsiders." Of course it's right, but it's useless. Above Li Hongzhang, there are the Premier's Office, the Ministry of War and the Empress Dowager Lafayette, all of whom are peacemakers, while the warring factions, Emperor Guangxu and Weng Tonghe, have no real power. They can only worry and shout in vain, and can't come up with practical measures. When the military was desperate, they could only agree to surrender and make peace.

History has proved that some small countries can rely on big countries to survive in the cracks, but big countries can't do this. China, which is huge and weak, will become the target of slaughter if it cannot stand on its own feet and put the foothold of the anti-aggression war on its own strength. To achieve peace, only good wishes are not enough, and relying on others is unreliable. You must be invincible in the war. Even Liang Qichao, a reform thinker, saw this truth clearly. He said: "Li Hongzhang's means is mainly to unite a country to control a country. Those who can survive without others in the world must have the way of self-reliance, and then they can help others without others. " Yes, war does not believe in tears, weak countries have no diplomacy, there is no chance of winning on the battlefield, and there is definitely nothing at the negotiating table. The historical lessons of the Sino-Japanese War fully proved this truth.

Third, believing in "weapon determinism" is the ideological reason for the failure of the war.

In modern wars, the role of weapons and equipment is far more important than in ancient times. Among politicians and militarists in the late Qing Dynasty, Li Hongzhang paid special attention to weapons and equipment. Because of his vigorous advocacy and operation, he promoted the Westernization Movement and formed the Beiyang Navy and the New Army, which was conducive to enhancing military strength. However, due to Li Hongzhang's extreme and absolute role of weapons, "weapon determinism" leads to pessimism and defeatism.

When the Korean battlefield was defeated, Li Hongzhang stated his point of view when reporting to the imperial court: "Where marching wins, naval battles only rely on ship guns, and land battles only rely on guns. With a slight advantage, the profits will be very different. The navy clippers have too few fast guns and just keep their mouths shut, so naval battles are really difficult. Pyongyang was defeated because it was outnumbered and its equipment stopped, not because the war was invalid. The danger of naval battle is even more serious than that of the army. In the battle at sea, ship speed, ship age and gun size are divided into strength and weakness. China's Clippers lost, so it's not a chance to win at sea. Don't rush to find a way to buy more. " Li Hongzhang's conclusion is that "his weapons are better than mine, and his skills are better than mine". Therefore, China's military equipment is "more than civil strife and insufficient defense against foreign invasion." As soon as Li Hongzhang's theory came out, the courtiers immediately refuted that the Westernization Movement had been going on for 30 years, which cost the country a huge sum of money. Why can't it be a world war It's just a fight with Britain, France, Germany and Russia. Why can't even beat Japan? Emperor Guangxu was very angry. He rebuked Li Hongzhang for "cowardice to escape and drag out an ignoble existence" and asked Beiyang Navy to concentrate its forces and go out quickly. However, Li Hongzhang was unmoved and still insisted that "Beiyang is a thousand miles away, and it is no less than a throw." Ordered the navy to "save the ship as long as the camera advances and retreats."

It is a universal law that the victory or defeat of a war depends on the comparison of military forces. It is not a common phenomenon that winning the strong with weakness requires specific conditions and winning more with less. But in the case of equal military strength, what will determine the outcome? This is beyond the explanation of the simple weapon theory. As the main commander of the war, the shadow of not winning will inevitably have a negative impact on the war situation, which is also one of the reasons for the low morale of the troops and repeated defeats.

The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, whether it is a general battle or a major battle, was not defeated by the comparison of military strength and the quality of weapons and equipment. Take the Yellow Sea naval battle as an example:

On September 1894 and 17, the main naval forces of China and Japan met in Dadonggou area near the border between China and North Korea in the Yellow Sea, and a great naval battle that shocked China and foreign countries broke out, which had a far-reaching impact on the process of the Sino-Japanese war. The strength of the Chinese and Japanese fleets participating in this naval battle is as follows:

Total number of warships, torpedo boats, armored ships, semi-armored ships, heavy guns and light guns, Chinese fleet/KOOC-0/4/KOOC-0/35,000 tons, Japanese fleet/KOOC-0/20/KOOC-0//KOOC-0/2094.

It can be seen that the strength of the two fleets is equal. The advantage of beiyang fleet is that there are many armored ships and heavy artillery. Among them, Dingyuan and Zhenyuan, two capital ships, were the leading and first-class warships in the Far East at that time in terms of armor, tonnage and artillery caliber. The advantage of the Japanese fleet is its speed and maneuverability. From a purely military point of view, the Chinese fleet still has a slight advantage, but the end of the naval battle is the opposite. Beiyang fleet was sunk by five warships and suffered heavy losses; The Japanese fleet did not lose a ship, only a few ships were injured. The victory of the Yellow Sea naval battle made Japan ecstatic. The emperor issued a decree to reward meritorious officers and soldiers, and wrote a military song "Great Victory in the Yellow Sea", which sang: "Fighting bravely and bravely, breaking the enemy's spirit, making our national flag shine high in the waves of the Yellow Sea." After that, beiyang fleet was even more afraid to go to sea, completely losing its due strategic role.

The direct causes of beiyang fleet's defeat in the Yellow Sea are: First, improper command. Originally, the scheduled battle formation was a double column, but when it approached the enemy ship, it became a loose goose-shaped horizontal line. There are two reasons, one is that the signal flag was hung wrong, and the other is that some warships failed to reach the scheduled position in time. Shortly after the war, the disrepair bridge of the flagship Dingyuan was collapsed by the recoil of its artillery. The navy prefect (Commander beiyang fleet) Ding fell off the bridge and was injured. He can't continue to command the battle, and he hasn't appointed an acting commander in advance. This fatal omission made the Chinese fleet lose its unified command from the beginning. Then the signal flag was destroyed and the connection between the flagship and the fleet was interrupted. Each ship can only fight in its own way, and it's a mess. Second, some generals are afraid of death and run when they get cold feet. In the fierce battle, Zhiyuan and Jingyuan were unfortunately sunk by the enemy, Jiyuan, Guang Jia and Yangwei fled in haste, and Jiyuan also hung a white flag shamefully. Not only weakened the combat effectiveness, but also seriously disrupted the morale of the army. Three of the four torpedo boats were frightened by the enemy's power, and they have been hiding in the distance and dare not participate in the war, which has not played any role. Third, the shell is not enough and the quality is poor. The battle lasted only five hours, but incredibly, there were not enough shells, and all the main guns in Dingyuan and Zhenyuan were used up. There are also problems with the quality of artillery shells, some of which don't ring, and some of which "don't crack when hitting enemy ships." Half a month before the Battle of the Yellow Sea, Hurd said in his report to the British government: "The current problem is arms. Beiyang fleet has medicine but no ammunition, bullets and no medicine. Von Hanneken (beiyang fleet's British adviser) was ordered to rob the ammunition. He wants to get enough shells for a few hours to prepare for the naval battle and fight at sea. So far, he can't get it. Worst of all, he is afraid that he will never get it. " Fourth, the level of military technology is low. A torpedo speedboat in beiyang fleet fired a torpedo 40 meters away from the enemy ship Xijing Maru, but it failed to hit (the torpedo crossed one meter from the bottom of the ship), which made the enemy ship escape. Japanese Navy Minister Eichhua Mountain supervised the battle on board, thus losing an excellent opportunity to destroy the enemy.

Although the battle of the Yellow Sea was defeated, it was still the best battle in the Sino-Japanese War. Most of the other campaigns and battles either collapsed at the first touch or fled with the wind. This is not a question of weapons, equipment or the number of soldiers at all. Augener, British ambassador to China, reported to his government: "Although China's army has considerable advantages over Japan in number, it lags far behind Japan in training, especially in management. The China authorities without foresight and lack of military knowledge will face the danger that the naval fleet will be completely destroyed. " Facts have proved that this Englishman is really insightful.

The combat effectiveness of the army is a direct factor that determines the outcome of the war, but the strength of the combat effectiveness depends not only on weapons and equipment, but also on the command, management, training, mental state, strategy and tactics of the army. The same is true of the Sino-Japanese War. It is unreasonable to attribute defeat entirely to weapons and equipment, which is a long-term misunderstanding.

4. Giving up and losing the right to control the sea is the strategic reason for the failure of the war.

Comrade Mao Zedong once said, "Measures follow principles. When the principle is not resistance, all measures reflect non-resistance. " The guiding ideology of the Qing government to avoid war and seek peace and passive defense is highlighted in the strategic mistake of ignoring and giving up the right to control the sea, which is an important reason for the failure of the Sino-Japanese War.

In modern wars, it is very important to master the right to control the sea. The so-called sea power simply means that one party can sail freely in a certain sea area, while the other party cannot sail freely. Whether we can master the right to control the sea depends on the strength and correct strategy of the navy. The sea power in the Sino-Japanese War mainly refers to the Yellow Sea. The Yellow Sea is connected with the maritime traffic of the Korean Peninsula, Liaodong Peninsula and Shandong Peninsula, so the sea control right of the Yellow Sea is very important.

The main battlefield of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 was on the side of North Korea and China. The Japanese army fought across the sea, and the supply line was very long, so it had to be transported by sea. Although China is fighting on interior lines, disrupting and cutting off the enemy's maritime traffic is an important measure to defeat the enemy. Therefore, it is necessary not only to concentrate the main force of the navy, find favorable opportunities to take the initiative to attack, but also to fight a decisive battle when necessary to contain the enemy navy. At that time, it was also powerful and possible. From 65438 to 0893, China's navy ranked ninth in the world, behind Britain, Germany, France, Russia, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy and Turkey, and before the United States and Japan. If the strategy is correct and the command is proper, we should be able to win some victories and achieve great results.

The Japanese government and military fully realized the importance of sea control in the war of aggression against China. Their long-term commitment to naval construction is based on this consideration. Before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, Japan's "wartime base camp" and the Minister of the Navy, Yongmu Huashan, formulated three strategies for three possible situations. First, if the naval battle is won and the sea control is obtained, the army will March and attack Liaodong, Shandong and Beijing; Second, if the outcome of the naval battle is undecided, the army will only occupy North Korea, and the navy will try its best to maintain the sea power in the Korean Strait; Third, if the naval battle fails, the Korean army retreats and the navy helps defend the Japanese coast. Japan's strategic thinking is very clear, and the whole war is centered on the struggle for sea power, and they have achieved the best of the three strategies envisaged. On the contrary, the Qing government and Li Hongzhang had a vague understanding of this important strategic issue and had no clear understanding of what role the navy should play in the war and how to play it. After the Korean War, the Japanese navy concentrated on finding the Chinese fleet for a decisive battle on the basis of full preparation, while the South Korean navy tried to avoid encountering the enemy at sea, and there was no ideological preparation and military preparation for a decisive battle. One party is active and the other is passive; One party is prepared and the other party is not prepared; One side waits for the decisive battle, and the other side passively avoids the war. Once encountered at sea, the consequences can be imagined.

Before the Yellow Sea naval battle, Li Hongzhang ordered beiyang fleet "not to engage in foreign war, which will cause damage" and "to protect the ship without damage, and only cruise Bohai Bay". Emperor Guangxu once asked beiyang fleet to go to war, but Li Hongzhang, with the support of Empress Dowager Cixi and Prince Gong, refused to carry out the imperial edict of taking the initiative to go to sea for decisive battle. Beiyang Navy has been staying at the gateway of Bohai Sea, and dare not take shortcuts at sea to transport goods to North Korea and transship them by land. The Japanese army "crisscrossed the three seas", and the transport vessels were unimpeded under the escort of the navy.

After the Yellow Sea War, although China's navy suffered losses, its main force remained, but Li Hongzhang was more conservative and completely lost confidence in naval warfare. He ordered: "The naval fleet will not go far" and can only "patrol the mountains and make a little noise". In the battle of Lvda, the navy commander Ding suggested that the main force should play in Lvda. Li Hongzhang reprimanded: "It's none of your business whether you keep the ship in Weihai or not. If you go out to sea, you will not beg for mercy even if you are killed. " Since then, the fleet has only been stranded in the port, and the Beiyang Navy, as a strategic military force, no longer has the mission of defending the Bohai Sea.

The loss of sea control makes coastal land warfare helpless and extremely passive, which is highlighted by the failure of two anti-landing operations.

Japanese soldiers attacked Liaodong Peninsula in two ways, all the way from Korea across the Yalu River, all the way from the sea and landed at Huayuankou. If successful, they can go directly to Lushun Road. However, this move by the Japanese army is also an adventure. Huayuankou is not an ideal landing place. The coastal beach here is very shallow, and large ships can't get close. Troops and materials need to be transported by motorboats and sampans. 36 Japanese troop carriers, with 24,000 men and a large number of military horses, landed on1October 23rd to1October 7th15th. The Qing government got the information of Japanese action in advance. If it can send a powerful force to guard the coast and attack enemy ships by the navy, it can form a double blow to the enemy. But strangely, the small Qing army on the shore fired a few shots and disappeared, and the navy didn't go out at all. Without resistance, the Japanese army was able to land calmly and open the door to attack Lushun. Soon, the Qing government operated for more than 20 years, and Lushun, an important military base costing tens of millions, was captured by the enemy, and a large number of ships, weapons, equipment and food were seized by the enemy. The Japanese army brutally attacked the city, killing tens of thousands of soldiers and civilians in Lushun, and only 36 people survived in the city.

Soon Rongcheng and Weihai made the same mistake again. Shandong Rongcheng is only 30 nautical miles away from the Beiyang naval base Weihai, which is the best route for the Japanese to attack Weihai. 1895 65438+1On October 29th, the Japanese joint fleet covered 50 troop carriers with 34,000 people and landed in Rongcheng in five days. The Chinese army failed to organize effective resistance, and the navy was close at hand, but Li Hongzhang ordered the "fleet to stick to Liu Gongdao with all its strength" and hid in Weihai to die. You Xiang Ito, commander of the Japanese fleet, later admitted: "If Ding Changru leads the fleet and attacks me with torpedo boats, can our army land safely?"

Landing and anti-landing operations are the most tragic types of operations. Generally speaking, the anti-landing party will rely on the defense system, including onshore positions and maritime attacks, so that the landing party under unfavorable conditions is caught between Scylla and Charybdis, or even fails to land, and the whole army is wiped out. There are many such examples at home and abroad.